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THE COPYRIGHT ACT’S LICENSING EXEMPTION
FOR RELIGIOUS PERFORMANCES OF
RELIGIOUS WORKS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Carolyn Homer Thomas*
INTRODUCTION
George Frideric Handel’s Messiah is one of the world’s most widely
known oratorios.  Handel, an eighteenth-century musician facing
debtor’s prison, wrote Messiah after a Dublin, Ireland charity commis-
sioned him to compose a work for a benefit concert.1  Critical and
popular acclaim spurred frequent performances of Messiah in both
churches and secular theatres.  These performances, and resulting roy-
alties, enabled Handel to continue composing baroque music.2  To this
day, every Christmas and Easter season, soloists, church choirs, com-
munity groups, and professional companies perform excerpts of the
work, including “Every Valley Shall Be Exalted,” “For Unto Us a
Child Is Born,” and the “Hallelujah Chorus.”3
Handel’s works, written in the decades following the enactment of
the 1709 Statute of Anne,4 have long since entered the public domain.
Today, churches and opera companies may perform Messiah without
obtaining a copyright license.  But even if, hypothetically, Messiah still
retained copyright protection, churches could perform it without a li-
cense.  Pursuant to the Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act), religious
works performed during religious services need not obtain licenses.5
As a result, even modern-day composers of religious oratorios are not
* Associate, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP.  J.D. 2012, The George Washington
University Law School.  Special thanks to Chip Lupu, Robert Tuttle, Joshua House, Meaghan
Kent and Joshua Kaufman for their insightful comments on previous drafts of this Article.
1. For a biography of Handel’s life and the circumstances surrounding composition of Mes-
siah, see generally PAUL HENRY LANG, GEORGE FRIDERIC HANDEL 332–56 (1966).
2. See id. at 332.
3. For example, the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts hosts an annual Messiah sing-
along. Event Calendar: Messiah Sing-Along, KENNEDY CENTER (Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.ken
nedy-center.org/text/calendar/event_details.cfm?event=MOHFM.  Other choruses have staged
“flash mob” performances of the “Hallelujah Chorus” in major shopping centers. E.g., Opera
Philadelphia, Opera Company of Philadelphia “Hallelujah!” Random Act of Culture, YOUTUBE
(Nov. 1, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WP_RHnQ-jgU.
4. Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1709, 8 Ann., c. 21 (Eng.).  The Statute of Anne
was Britain’s first copyright law.
5. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(3) (2012).
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entitled to any revenue from the performance of those works during
church services.  For example, although Julian Anderson’s Heaven is
Shy of Earth premiered in London in 2010, his original settings of
Latin religious texts6 could theoretically be performed, without licens-
ing, during Sunday services by American churches.7
While the 1976 Act also exempts various charitable, educational,
and nonprofit performances from performance licensing, § 110(3) of
that Act grants a broader exemption for religious performances in
three ways.  First, it exempts general nonprofits from liability for unli-
censed performances of nondramatic and musical works.8  For relig-
ious assemblies, in particular, it additionally exempts unlicensed
performances of religious dramatico-musical works, such as Handel’s
Messiah or Anderson’s Heaven is Shy of Earth.9  Second, the 1976 Act
forbids performances for “indirect commercial advantage” by general
nonprofits, but  places no commercial qualification on permissible re-
ligious performances.10  Third, it requires that, to be eligible for ex-
emption, general nonprofit performances must not compensate the
musical performers, but places no such limitation on religious per-
formances.11  This licensing freedom allows churches to pay profes-
sional music staff.12
Pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, Con-
gress is allowed to accommodate religious activity by exempting it
from otherwise applicable laws, including copyright law.13  Such statu-
tory accommodations, however, risk being held unconstitutional
under the Establishment Clause if they either do not alleviate “excep-
tional” government-created burdens on private religious exercise or if
6. Anderson’s ‘Heaven is Shy of Earth’ Revived at the Barbican, FABER MUSIC (Nov. 4, 2010),
http://www.fabermusic.com/news/story/andersons-heaven-is-shy-of-earth-revived-at-the-barbi
can.aspx?ComposerId=13.  See a full description of the work at Heaven is Shy of Earth (2006),
FABER MUSIC, http://www.fabermusic.com/Repertoire-Details.aspx?ID=4619 (last visited Aug.
21, 2013).
7. The 1976 Act’s exemption applies to musical performances across all faiths. However, be-
cause Christianity is the majority religion in America, see PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC
LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY 10 (2008), and because music is important to Chris-
tian worship, see generally ANDREW WILSON-DICKSON, THE STORY OF CHRISTIAN MUSIC (For-
tress Press 2003) (1992), this Article will primarily feature examples from that religious tradition.
As a result, while “churches” will be used as the generic religious institution for this Article, the
same legal principles would apply to synagogues, mosques, temples, and the like.
8. 17 U.S.C. § 110(4).
9. Id. § 110(3).
10. Id. § 110(3)–(4).
11. Id.
12. See id. § 110(3).
13. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338–89 (1987).
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they impose unreasonable burdens on third parties.14  Additionally,
these accommodations may be unconstitutional if they require the
state to entangle itself in parsing what is religious content and what is
not.15  Because § 110(3) does not alleviate an exceptional burden on
religious performances of copyrighted works, imposes more than a de
minimis burden on copyright holders to subsidize religious perform-
ances, and requires courts to adjudicate what constitutes religious
works performed in the course of religious services, it violates the Es-
tablishment Clause.  Congress should cure this constitutional defect
by amending the 1976 Act to grant the same performance-licensing
exemption to all educational, charitable, and religious institutions,
while preserving a much narrower accommodation which recognizes
religious institutions’ unique need for paid musical staff.
This Article first addresses U.S. copyright law’s history of perform-
ance exemptions for nonprofit and religious organizations.  Part II
analyzes the legislative debate surrounding these exemptions prior to
the enactment of the 1976 Act, explaining how the statute evolved to
grant a broader exemption to religious performances than other non-
profit entities.  In light of this legislative history and subsequent devel-
opments in First Amendment jurisprudence, Part III examines the
constitutionality of the 1976 Act’s religious exemption under the Es-
tablishment Clause of the First Amendment.  Ultimately, this Article
concludes that 17 U.S.C. § 110(3) is unconstitutional, and that Con-
gress should either repeal or materially amend the clause to cure the
defect.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF NONPROFIT EXEMPTIONS FOR
PERFORMANCE LICENSING FROM 1909 TO 1976
The Constitution grants Congress the power to “promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.”16  Pursuant to this authority, the First Congress
passed the Copyright Act of 1790,—modeled on the 1709 British Stat-
ute of Anne—which only protected maps, charts, and books.17  Later,
Congress added an exclusive right of public performance.18
Congress significantly revised its copyright legislation in 1909.  The
Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act) continued to recognize performance
14. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005).
15. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 20 (1989) (plurality opinion).
16. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
17. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831).
18. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138, 139 (repealed 1870).
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rights, but it granted different performance rights to different classes
of works.  Authors of nondramatic literary works had the exclusive
right to “deliver or authorize the delivery of the copyrighted work in
public for profit.”19  Similarly, composers of musical works had the
exclusive right to perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit.20
Creators of dramatic works had even more expansive rights than these
first two.21  They possessed an exclusive right to “perform or represent
the copyrighted work publicly,” regardless of whether the perform-
ance was free or for profit.22
Thus, except for performances of dramatic works, nonprofit per-
formances could not, by their very nature, constitute copyright in-
fringement.  This distinction between for-profit and nonprofit
performances undergirded the entire 1909 Copyright Act.  Exempting
nonprofit performances stemmed from public concern that a blanket
licensing requirement would be “too drastic a restraint upon . . . the
free enjoyment of music.”23  In response to these concerns, the Ameri-
can Bar Association negotiated a compromise whereby authors’ pub-
lic-performance rights in musical works were limited to public
performances for profit.24  This compromise was ultimately codified
into law through the 1909 Act.
A. The Educational, Charitable, and Religious Exemption from the
Exclusive Right of Public Performance Under Section 104
of the 1909 Act
In addition to distinguishing between for-profit and nonprofit per-
formances generally, the 1909 Act exempted various school groups,
19. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1(c), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 (repealed 1978).  Nondramatic
literary works are those which are not, by their very nature, intended to be performed.  The
work is narrated, rather than scripted.  Novels, textbooks, essays, articles, poetry, speeches, and
sermons all fit within this category. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FL-109, COPYRIGHT REGIS-
TRATION OF BOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS, AND SPEECHES (2011), available at http://www.copyright.gov/
fls/fl109.html.
20. Copyright Act of 1909 § 1(e), 35 Stat. at 1075.  Musical works are now categorized as
nondramatic.  These include songs, records, instrumental works, and sheet music. See U.S. COP-
YRIGHT OFFICE, FL-105, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION OF MUSIC, available at http://www.copy
right.gov/fls/fl105.html.
21. Dramatic works are those intended to be performed.  These include skits, plays, musicals,
operas, and movies as well as choreographed routines such as ballets. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
FL-119, DRAMATIC WORKS: SCRIPTS, PANTOMIMES, AND CHOREOGRAPHY (2010), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl119.html.
22. Copyright Act of 1909 § 1(d), 35 Stat. at 1075.
23. To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearings on S. 6330 and H.R.
19853 Before the H. and S. Comms. on Patents, 59th Cong. 161 (1906) (statement of Arthur
Steuart, Chairman, ABA Copyright Comm.).
24. Id.
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church choirs, and vocal societies from copyright liability, so long as
they performed for “charitable or educational purposes and not for
profit.”25
This language was redundant because most nonprofit performances
could not be infringing; the 1909 Act only granted exclusive rights for
for-profit performances.26  The provision primarily served as evidence
that educational, charitable, and religious activities were those which
Congress found most deserving of an exemption.27  Nevertheless, sec-
tion 104 of the 1909 Act potentially added value by exempting some
dramatic works, such as “oratorios, cantatas, masses, or octavo
choruses,” in addition to the nondramatic music already covered by
the 1909 Act’s for-profit limitation.28  As the Copyright Office later
understood the provision, section 104 “might be construed as allowing
performance of some dramatico-musical works during religious ser-
vices that would otherwise be prevented.”29  However, the Copyright
Office slightly misconstrued section 104, as that exemption did not
give any special preference to religion.  Rather, it exempted both re-
ligious and secular dramatic works performed by both religious and
secular community choral associations.30
Ultimately, only two courts ever interpreted the section 104 excep-
tion.  In John Church Co. v. Hillibard Hotel Co., the Second Circuit
interpreted “for profit” as charging individuals for attending a public
performance, with the proceeds benefiting a commercial enterprise.31
There, the composer unsuccessfully sought to enjoin a professional
25. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 391, § 104, 61 Stat. 652, 662 (1947) (repealed 1978) (original
version at ch. 320, § 28, 35 Stat. 1075, 1082 (1909)).  This exemption was originally set forth in the
1909 Act as section 28.  A subsequent act of Congress in 1947 repealed and reenacted the 1909
Act with a new structure, after which the exemption appeared as section 104.  The language of
the original section 28 and that of the later section 104 are nearly identical.  Because much of the
congressional materials regarding the copyright law revision in the 1950s and 1960s referred to
the exemption as section 104, and for greater ease of understanding for the reader, this Author
will continue to refer to the exemption as section 104 throughout the text of this Article.
26. Copyright Act of 1909 § 1(e), 35 Stat. at 1075.
27. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDIES
PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, STUDY NO.
16: LIMITATIONS ON PERFORMING RIGHTS 84 (Comm. Print 1960) (authored by Borge Varmer).
28. Copyright Act of 1909 § 104, 61 Stat. at 662.  For example, Edward Elgar’s religious orato-
rios The Apostles and The Kingdom were popular during this era.  Both for-profit and nonprofit
performances of those works would have been subject to infringement liability.  Section 104
exempted performances by community vocal societies from this liability.
29. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISIONS, PART
6: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL  38 (Comm. Print 1965).
30. Copyright Act of 1909 § 104, 61 Stat. at 662.
31. John Church Co. v. Hilliard Hotel Co., 221 F. 229, 230–31 (2d Cir. 1915), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom., Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917).
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orchestra from playing his works in the lobby of the Hotel Vander-
bilt.32  Although the Hotel Vanderbilt paid the orchestra—and even
though the district court held that the paid orchestra evinced a “for
profit” motive to attract more customers—the Second Circuit con-
cluded that the 1909 Act only required licenses for those perform-
ances which charged admissions fees.33  In dicta, Judge Henry Ward
contrasted this admission-fee construction with the choral exception
granted in section 104.34  In his view, section 104 permitted choral
concerts to charge admission fees, so long as the proceeds were ap-
plied to a charitable or educational purpose.35  Even if a community
chorus performed a dramatic work, it would not infringe the work’s
copyright so long as it did not realize a commercial profit.
Judge Ward’s interpretation of section 104 was not revisited for
nearly sixty years, until a religious troupe utilized it as a defense to its
infringement of Andrew Lloyd Webber’s Jesus Christ Superstar. In
Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O’Reilly, three Catholic priests
formed a musical ministry which reached out to and performed for
distressed youths in St. Louis.36  The group achieved success, releasing
albums, holding charitable concerts, and appearing on national televi-
sion.37  All monetary proceeds from these activities funded the
group’s charitable purposes.38  The publicity from their music minis-
try’s success led the priests to contract with a production company and
form the for-profit International Rock Opera Company to adapt and
perform Jesus Christ Superstar.39  Neither the priests’ ministry, nor the
opera company, ever acquired a license for the musical.40  When An-
drew Lloyd Webber sued for infringement, the priests defended on
the basis of section 104.41  The priests asserted that their religious af-
filiation and charitable purpose insulated them from liability, in accor-
dance with Judge Ward’s analysis from John Church.42
The court rejected the priests’ defense.43  According to the court,
while the priests’ nonprofit organization may have independently
32. Id. at 229–231.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 230.
35. Id.
36. Robert Stigwood Grp., Ltd. v. O’Reilly, 346 F. Supp. 376, 379 (D. Conn. 1972), rev’d on
other grounds, 530 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1976).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 379–80.
40. Id. at 380.
41. Id.
42. See Robert Stigwood, 346 F. Supp. at 380.
43. Id. at 382.
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qualified as a church choir or vocal society under the 1909 Act, their
contractual affiliation with the for-profit International Rock Opera
Company most certainly did not.44  Because the Company was a pro-
fessional corporation which had already grossed $300,000 from fifty
for-profit performances, section 104 did not apply.45  Furthermore,
“[t]he mere fact that the many professional performers are under the
direction of a few priests cannot turn a professional touring company
into a church choir,” wrote the court.46
In the course of its section 104 analysis, however, the district court
made a problematic distinction.  It assumed that in order to qualify for
the section 104 exemption, performances by church choirs must occur
within a religious setting.47  The court concluded that the Interna-
tional Rock Opera Company was not a church choir because the per-
formances of Jesus Christ Superstar were “not given in churches nor
[were] they part of any church services.”48  The court’s interpretation
did not comport with the express language of section 104.  Section 104
placed no limits on where performances were conducted; rather, it
only described the types of societies which were exempt49—a signifi-
cant distinction considering that both religious and secular vocal socie-
ties have rich histories of musical performances in America.50  Under
the 1909 Act, both secular and religious musical organizations would
have been equally entitled to the nonprofit copyright exemption, re-
gardless of venue.  The court’s impulse to evaluate the religious qual-
ity of performances, however, presaged a development under the 1976
Act.  As will be discussed later, statutory requirements that the state
evaluate the religious character of copyrighted works and perform-
ances raise significant Establishment Clause concerns.
B. Congressional Debate Surrounding the Scope of Nonprofit
Exemptions Prior to the Enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976
United States copyright law did not change significantly between
1909 and 1976.  Congress floated bills to revise copyrights during this
time frame but tabled all of them without significant consideration.51
In 1955, Congress began a general copyright law revision to address
44. Id. at 381.
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. Robert Stigwood, 346 F. Supp at 381.
49. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 391, § 104, 61 Stat. 652, 662 (1947) (repealed 1978).
50. See generally LOUIS CHARLES ELSON, THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN MUSIC 73–94 (1915).
51. See generally STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVI-
SION: STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPY-
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intellectual property rights in light of new communications mediums.52
This bill, largely based on draft legislation by the Copyright Office,
laid the foundation for the Copyright Act of 1976.
The Copyright Office’s initial draft eliminated the blanket “profit-
versus-nonprofit” performance distinction which undergirded the
1909 Act.53  The Copyright Office instead granted an exclusive per-
formance right to authors and composers, subject to specifically delin-
eated exemptions.54  Unlike the “vocal society” exemption found in
section 104 of the 1909 Act, which was largely redundant due to its
nonprofit limitation,55 the new exemptions carried substantive weight.
Several exemptions continued to insulate educational, charitable, and
religious performances from copyright liability.56  In particular,
§ 110(4) exempted general not-for-profit performances, while § 110(3)
exempted some religious performances more broadly.57  The exact re-
quirements of §§ 110(3) and 110(4) will be discussed next.
1. The Proposed Section 110(4) Exemption for Nonprofit
Performances of Nondramatic and Musical Works
The proposed § 110(4) extended an exemption to general nonprofit
activities.58  This section preserved the essence of the exemption
granted in section 104 of the 1909 Act.59  Unlicensed performances
were considered noninfringing if volunteers performed the work and
RIGHTS, STUDY NO. 16: LIMITATIONS ON PERFORMING RIGHTS (Comm. Print 1960) (authored by
Borge Varmer).
52. Id. at III.
53. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION,
PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVI-
SION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 21 (Comm. Print 1965); see also Copy-
right Law Revision: Hearings on S. 1005 Before the S. Subcomm. On Patents, Trademarks, and
Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 67 (1966) [hereinafter S. 1005 Hearings]
(statement of Abraham L. Kaminstein, Register of Copyrights).
54. See STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION,
PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVI-
SION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL  21 (Comm. Print 1965).
55. See id. at 38.
56. 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2012).
57. 17 U.S.C. § 110.  The Copyright Office’s original draft introduced these exemptions under
§ 109, but for the sake of consistency this Article will refer to them under § 110, where they were
ultimately codified.
58. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(4).  This was originally proposed as § 109(4).  Because that proposal
does not materially differ from the final codification at 17 U.S.C. § 110(4), the final codified
version is included at this point.  For comparison purposes, the earliest draft can be found at
STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 6:
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 196 (Comm. Print 1965).
59. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(3)–(4).
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either (1) the public could freely listen, or (2) the proceeds served an
educational, religious, or charitable purpose and the copyright owner
did not specifically object to the performance.60  This framework con-
tinued to allow deserving nonprofits to perform nondramatic and mu-
sical works without a formal license.61
At the same time, the proposed § 110(4) narrowed the scope of the
exemption in three important ways.  First, it codified the legislative
intent, as theorized by Judge Ward in John Church, that admissions
fees be permissible so long as they served a charitable purpose.62  If a
performance charged an admission fee, however, the copyright owner
now had the right to veto the performance.63  Second, § 110(4) elimi-
nated the loophole that the Hotel Vanderbilt and the Jesus Christ
Superstar musical ministry had attempted to exploit.  Under the new
provision, indirect commercial motives or paid professional perform-
ers automatically eliminated a group from infringement protection.64
Third, § 110(4) notably did not cover performances of any dramatic or
dramatico-musical works.  As a result, general nonprofit institutions
would now be required to license all dramatic works.
2. The Original Proposed Section 110(3) Exemption for
Performances During Religious Services
In narrowing the scope of the exemption for general nonprofits, the
Copyright Office created complications for religious performances.
Church performances could now fail to qualify for the § 110(4) ex-
emption, and thus face infringement liability, on three new grounds.
First, churches would no longer be protected in their performances of
dramatic religious works, such as Edward Elgar’s The Apostles or Ju-
lian Anderson’s contemporary Heaven is Shy of Earth.  Second, par-
ticularly at megachurches, musical performances could arguably be of
“indirect commercial advantage” as they serve to attract more congre-
gants.65  Third, churches’ organists, vocalists, contemporary worship
60. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 85–86 (1976).
61. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION:
STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS,
STUDY NO. 16: LIMITATIONS ON PERFORMING RIGHTS 84 (Comm. Print 1960) (authored by
Borge Varmer).
62. John Church Co. v. Hillard Hotel Co., 221 F. 229, 230 (2d Cir. 1915).
63. 17 U.S.C. § 110(4).
64. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 85 (“[P]ublic performances given or sponsored in connec-
tion with any commercial or profit-making enterprises are subject to the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner even though the public is not charged for seeing or hearing the performance.”).
65. See Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir.
2000) (noting that churches profit from attracting new members and tithing).  Additionally,
megachurches often include coffee shops, bookstores, and other commercial enterprises within
58 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:49
bands, and music ministers are often paid professionals, which would
preclude them from infringement protection.66
To forestall these particular concerns about the religious use of mu-
sic, the Copyright Office proposed a more sweeping religious exemp-
tion than the one § 110(4) granted to general educational and
charitable uses.  Whereas the proposed § 110(4) restricted permissible
performances by general nonprofits, § 110(3) expanded permissible
performances for religious services.
Under the 1965 draft bill, performances during religious services
would be categorically exempt from the restraints § 110(4) imposed
on general nonprofits.67  Churches could still pay their performers
without nonprofit or admission-fee contingencies attached.  Further-
more, such services did not need to take place in a church.  As the
Register of Copyrights testified in 1965, “[A]s long as services are be-
ing conducted before a religious gathering, the exemption would ap-
ply . . . in places such as auditoriums, outdoor theaters, and the like.”68
This “in the course of services” language effectively nullified the Rob-
ert Stigwood court’s refusal to apply the church vocal society excep-
tion to performances outside of churches.69
The “in the course of services” language, however, limited religious
performances in other ways.  Not all church performances would be
covered: Social, educational, or fundraising performances would have
the church building.  If these churches advertise their musical worship services in the community,
a plausible case could be made that this is of indirect commercial advantage. See Jonathan D.
Weiss & Randy Lowell, Supersizing Religion: Megachurches, Sprawl, and Smart Growth, 21 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 313, 322 (2002) (“[I]f a megachurch is able to claim religious protection
for [a] commercial entity, then it gains a competitive advantage over non-religious commercial
enterprises.”).
66. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 85.  The legislative history for § 110(4) provides that paying
a salary for general duties that also encompass performances—such as those of a high school
music teacher—would not override the exemption. Id. In the religious services context, it ap-
pears that some religious performances by salaried staff, such as full-time music ministers, might
fall under this provision, but others would not.  Paid singers and organists for Sunday services,
for example, would not fall within § 110(4)’s exemption because they are paid for their perform-
ance duties alone.  While barred from § 110(4) protection, however, the same religious perform-
ers would fall within § 110(3)’s exception.  Thus, in at least this context, § 110(3)’s religious
exemption is broader than the general nonprofit one.
67. See S. 1005 Hearings, supra note 53, at 115 (statement of Abraham L. Kaminstein, Regis-
ter of Copyrights).
68. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 84–85; cf. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG.,
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPY-
RIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 38
(Comm. Print 1965).
69. Robert Stigwood Grp., Ltd. v. O’Reilly, 346 F. Supp. 376, 381 (D. Conn. 1972).
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to comply with the terms of § 110(4) to be exempt.70  Further, “ser-
vices” only encompassed the live event; television broadcasts and
other transmissions would constitute a separate performance and
therefore be infringing.71  The terms of the religious exemption would
prove to be controversial.
3. The Debate and Subsequent Amendments Surrounding a
Religious Exemption for Dramatico-Musical Works
Another critical difference between § 110(3)’s religious exemption
and § 110(4)’s general nonprofit exemption was that, whereas § 110(4)
only applied to nondramatic and musical works, § 110(3) also included
dramatico-musical works.72  While the Copyright Office had originally
limited the religious exemption to the same classes of works as general
nonprofits,73 it was “very strenuously urged to expand the exemption”
in order to cover cantatas, oratorios, and other dramatico-musical
works.74  The exemption was intended to give churches the freedom to
perform sacred music that could be regarded as dramatic in
character.75
Authors, composers, and publishers rapidly decried the dramatico-
musical-works exception for religious services as overbroad.76  The
Copyright Office itself realized the language might be too permissive,
and subsequently encouraged Congress to amend the Act.77  Not
wanting to authorize churches to perform “all or part of a secular op-
era or musical play under the color of it being ‘in the course of relig-
ious services,’” the Copyright Office suggested that Congress “qualify
70. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT REVISION, PART 6:
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 38 (Comm. Print 1965).
71. Id.
72. 17 U.S.C. § 110(3)–(4) (2012).
73. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 6:
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 38 (Comm. Print 1965).  In fact, the clause had
changed during the drafting of the report itself—the draft text at the end of the report does not
include dramatico-musical works, exempting only “performance or exhibition of the work in the
course of services at a place of worship or other religious assembly.” Id. at 197.
74. Id. at 38.
75. See id.
76. See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835
Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 1, 89th Cong. 196 (1965) [herein-
after H.R. 4347, 5680, 6831, 6835 Hearings] (statement of Herman Finkelstein, General Counsel,
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers).
77. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT REVISION, PART 6:
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 38 (Comm. Print 1965).
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‘dramatico-musical work’ with a phrase such as ‘of a religious
nature.’”78
The Judiciary Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copy-
rights (Subcommittee) generated controversy by not adding the quali-
fying phrase “of a religious nature” prior to holding hearings on the
bill.79  On behalf of the Authors League of America, Rex Stout sought
to limit the unlicensed performance of dramatico-musical works to
those works of a religious nature.80  Stout worried that “it could be
too easily misunderstood and abused.”81
The concept of what constitutes a religious service is as varied as the
diversity of religious denominations in our country.  Jazz, ballet,
plays, and other works—that are not conventionally thought of as
the substance of a religious service—have been performed during
some service[s].  The use of a popular musical comedy in the course
of such a service might be helpful in attracting an audience or illus-
trating a religious theme, but it would be essentially a public per-
formance of the work and should only be permitted with its author’s
consent.82
In this same series of hearings, numerous other author, composer,
and publisher trade associations similarly advocated for a qualification
that the exempt dramatico-musical works be “of a religious nature.”83
The Music Publishers’ Association (MPA) sought to eliminate the ex-
emption altogether because it discriminated against creators of sacred
music.84  The MPA testified that its members published 75% of the
religious music used in Protestant churches nationwide.85  While relig-
ious sheet music sold well, the performance-right exemption from the
1909 Act, carried into the present proposal, resulted in the loss of a
78. Id.
79. See H.R. 4347, 5680, 6831, 6835 Hearings, supra note 76, at 157 (statement of Alfred H.
Wasserstrom, Chairman, Copyright Committee, Magazine Publishers Association) (“[I]t does
not seem to us to be in the wise public interest to immunize as completely as these subsections
would those particular uses of works otherwise protected.”).
80. Id. at 96 (summary of statement by the Authors League of America).
81. Id. at 90 (statement of Rex Stout, President, Authors League of America).
82. Id.
83. See id. at 134 (joint memorandum of American Book Publishers Council; American Guild
of Authors & Composers; American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers; American
Textbook Publishers Institute; The Authors League of America; Composers and Lyricists Guild
of America; Music Publishers’ Protective Association; Music Publishers Association of the
United States); see also id. at 176–77 (statement of Herman Finkelstein, General Counsel, Amer-
ican Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers).
84. See id. at 284 (statement of Ed Lorenz, Managing General Partner, Lorenz Publishing
Co.).
85. H.R. 4347, 6580, 6831, 6835 Hearings, supra note 76, at 281 (statement of Ed Lorenz,
Managing General Partner, Lorenz Publishing Co.).
2013] THE COPYRIGHT ACT’S LICENSING EXEMPTION 61
significant amount of licensing revenue, which was detrimental to the
creators’ livelihoods.86
By March of 1967, the Senate had formally added the “dramatico-
musical work of a religious nature” limiting language to § 110(3).87
This change satisfied the American Society of Composers, Authors
and Publishers (ASCAP) and, presumably, their peer trade associa-
tions.88  In the final legislative history report on the 1976 Act, Con-
gress specifically noted that the exemption for “dramatico-musical
works of a religious nature” was “not intended to cover performances
of secular operas, musical plays, motion pictures, and the like, even if
they have an underlying religious or philosophical theme.”89  Thus,
Congress intended that works such as Jesus Christ Superstar and Jo-
seph and the Amazing Technicolor Dreamcoat could not be performed
during religious services without a license.
Even with the limiting language, some groups remained unhappy
with the exemption, feeling that it conferred too great a benefit to
religious institutions.90  From the other side, the National Council of
Churches (NCC) thought the limitations on religious performances
were too strict.  In April of 1967, Reverend William Fore, the Execu-
tive Director for the NCC, testified before the Subcommittee.91  On
behalf of the NCC’s member churches, he requested that the exemp-
tion be made more encompassing by eliminating both the dramatico-
musical works “of a religious nature” and the “performance . . . in the
course of services” qualifications.92  However, the Senate took no ac-
tion on his recommendations.  Thereafter, from the spring of 1967 un-
til the final passage of the 1976 Act, § 110(3)’s religious exemption
clause underwent no significant change.93
86. See id. at 283–84.
87. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 597 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trade-
marks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 1, 90th Cong. 7 (1967).
88. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 597 Before the Subcomm. On Patents, Trade-
marks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 2, 90th Cong. 346 (1967) [hereinaf-
ter S. 597 Hearings, Part 2] (statement of Herman Finkelstein, General Counsel, American
Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers).
89. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 84 (1976).
90. See, e.g., H.R. 4347, 5680, 6831, 6835 Hearings, supra note 76, at 282–83 (statement of Ed
Lorenz, Managing General Partner, Lorenz Publishing Co.).
91. S. 597 Hearings, Part 2, supra note 88, at 636 (statement of Rev. William F. Fore, Execu-
tive Director, National Council of the Churches of Christ).
92. Id. at 639.
93. For a while, the Senate version of the bill also exempted sound recordings played during
religious services, but this language was dropped in September of 1974. Compare 120 CONG.
REC. 30,343 (1974) (September 5, 1974 version), with 120 CONG. REC. 30,500 (1974) (September
9, 1974 version).  The final legislative history noted that “the scope of the clause does not cover
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On February 19, 1976, the Copyright Act of 1976 was unanimously
passed by the Senate.94  It was subsequently passed by the House in
September, was signed by President Gerald Ford in October, and took
full effect in 1978.95  The final language of the religious exemption
provided:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the following are not
infringements of copyright:
. . . .
(3) performance of a nondramatic literary or musical work or of a
dramatico-musical work of a religious nature, or display of a work,
in the course of services at a place of worship or other religious
assembly . . . .96
The section remains untouched today.97
C. Judicial Interpretation of the Religious Performance Exemption
Only two courts have directly considered the scope of § 110(3)’s re-
ligious exemption, and both ruled against the churches that attempted
to utilize it as an infringement defense.  In Simpleville Music v. Mizell,
two radio stations broadcasted fifteen songs without permission from
ASCAP, including religiously themed works such as “I Can Only Im-
agine.”98  With respect to the religious works, the radio stations ar-
gued that because they had broadcast the performances directly from
religious services, § 110(3) insulated them from liability.99  The court
rejected this assertion, noting that copyright law treats live perform-
the sequential showing of motion pictures and other audiovisual works.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476,
at 84.
94. 122 CONG. REC. 3841 (1976).
95. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101–810 (2012)).
96. Id. § 110(3), 90 Stat. at 2549 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 110(3) (2012)).
97. In 1996, as part of the debate surrounding the Copyright Term Extension Act, Senators
Hank Brown and Strom Thurmond proposed an amendment to expand the religious exemption.
Copyright Term Extension Bill is Approved by Senate Committee, 52 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPY-
RIGHT J. (BNA) 137, 137 (1996).  Under their proposed addition to § 110(3), public or closed
circuit broadcasting of religious services would not be infringing so long as there was no com-
mercial sponsor.  S. 1628, 104th Cong. § 4 (1996), reprinted in 51 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPY-
RIGHT J. (BNA) 648 (1996).  Senator Fred Thompson spoke out against the amendment as
denying religious songwriters their fair compensation. See Copyright Term Extension Bill is Ap-
proved by Senate Committee, supra, at 137.  The amendment was tabled without further debate.
See id.
98. Simpleville Music v. Mizell, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1295 (M.D. Ala. 2006).  The chorus of “I
Can Only Imagine” is:
Surrounded by Your glory, what will my heart feel?  Will I dance for you Jesus, or in
awe of you be still?  Will I stand in your presence, or to my knees will I fall? Will I sing
hallelujah? Will I be able to speak at all? I can only imagine!
MERCYME, I Can Only Imagine, on ALMOST THERE (INO Records 2001).
99. Mizell, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
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ances and broadcasts of those performances as two separate events.100
While live religious performances could be exempt, the radio stations’
transmissions of those same performances were not.101  The religious
exemption did “not extend to religious broadcasts or other transmis-
sions to the public at large,” because “such broadcasts are not ‘at a
place of worship.’”102
In the only other § 110(3) case, Worldwide Church of God v. Phila-
delphia Church of God, Inc., a dispute arose over the permissible use
of religious scripture after a schism in the denomination.103  The Ninth
Circuit held that using a copyrighted religious text without a license in
a schismatic congregation was not a fair use.104  Pursuant to its fair use
analysis, the court noted that § 110(3)’s religious exemption applied
only to performances, not paper copies of a work.105  The Worldwide
Church of God, as the owner of the scripture’s copyright, had a sepa-
rate exclusive right to reproduce and distribute copies of its former
pastor’s work, Mystery of the Ages.106  While the schismatic Philadel-
phia Church of God’s readings from the Mystery of the Ages during
services might have been protected under § 110(3), its unauthorized
copying and distribution of the work fell “outside of that narrow ex-
ception to copyright protection.”107
D. The Current State of the Copyright Exemptions
Governing Religious Entities
Ultimately, religious institutions qualify, along with other charitable
and educational institutions, for the general protections of § 110(4).
Under that section, unpaid performers of nondramatic or musical
works need not acquire a license if either (1) the performance is free
to the public, or (2) any admission fee contributes directly to an edu-
100. Id.; see also STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION, PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GEN-
ERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 38 (Comm. Print 1965).
101. Mizell, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
102. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 84 (1976)).
103. Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.
2000).  Herbert Armstrong founded the Worldwide Church of God.  After his death, Arm-
strong’s original California congregation substantially revised the doctrine and stopped using
Armstrong’s book of teachings, Mystery of the Ages.  The Philadelphia Church of God wished to
continue using the book, but the original congregation sued it for copyright infringement.
104. Id. at 1121.
105. Id. at 1115.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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cational, religious, or charitable purpose and the copyright owner has
not objected to the performance.108
Religious institutions receive an additional exemption under
§ 110(3).  A church is not required to obtain a license for live perform-
ances during the course of religious services.109  Only nondramatic,
musical, and dramatico-musical works of a religious nature may be
performed without a license.110  Secular musicals which happen to
contain religious storylines or themes, however, do not qualify as
“dramatico-musical works of a religious nature” and therefore must
be licensed.111
Section 110(3) confers a small but discrete set of benefits upon
churches alone.  During religious services, churches may theoretically
pay their performers, charge admission fees, and perform religiously
themed dramatic works without a license.112  Considering the diversity
of religious services in America, religious institutions receive broader
protection from infringement liability than other nonprofit
organizations.113
III. RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE DILEMMA
A. Legal Backdrop of Religious Accommodations
As the history of the § 110(3) religious exemption attests, neither
Congress nor the courts have ever considered the underlying constitu-
tionality of exempting religious performances from copyright liability.
Granting a broader copyright exemption to churches than to similarly
situated schools and charitable organizations, however, raises a seri-
ous constitutional concern.  While Congress is constitutionally allowed
to accommodate the free exercise of religion, such accommodation
108. 17 U.S.C. § 110(4) (2012).
109. Id. § 110(3).  Live performances do not include audiovisual recordings or broadcast
transmissions. See id. § 101 (defining what it means to perform a work “publicly”).
110. Id. § 110(3).
111. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 84 (1976).
112. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(3).
113. Technically, § 110(3)’s language does not confer the exemption upon the type of institu-
tion, but rather only upon the type of performance.  Therefore, theoretically, a professional
troupe affiliated with no religion could rent out a church’s auditorium, perform a religious work,
charge admissions fees, earn a profit, and still qualify for the exemption if they could convince a
jury that it occurred “in the course of religious services.”  Practically speaking, however, it is
churches and other religious institutions which will be most credibly able to take advantage of
the exemption.
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risks trespassing on the First Amendment’s prohibition against Con-
gress making laws “respecting an establishment of religion.”114
In the original hearings on § 110(3)’s religious exemption, only the
National Council of Churches raised even a whiff of a constitutional
question.  In the NCC’s introduction to its congressional testimony, it
summarily defended § 110(3)’s constitutionality.  Emphasizing Su-
preme Court rhetoric that “the place of religion in our society is an
exalted one,” the NCC favored interpreting § 110(3) as merely one
exemption among many to the exclusive right of public perform-
ance.115  Not a single Senator questioned the NCC on this point.116
Even if the NCC’s analysis was constitutionally accurate in 1967,
much has changed in constitutional law interpretation of the Religion
Clauses since that era.  In the landmark case Employment Division v.
Smith,117 the Supreme Court departed from precedent set in Sherbert
v. Verner118 and Wisconsin v. Yoder.119  In Smith, the Supreme Court
held that the Free Exercise Clause alone does not justify religious
noncompliance with generally applicable statutes.120  As the Court
had previously unanimously held in Corporation of the Presiding
Bishop v. Amos, a middle ground exists between how much govern-
ment must recognize religion under the Free Exercise Clause and how
much government must eschew religion under the Establishment
Clause.121  Under Amos, the legislature can specifically exempt relig-
ion from the requirements of generally applicable statutes.122  Thus, as
the Smith Court itself recognized, Congress remains free to accommo-
date religion by granting it specific exemptions to otherwise generally
applicable statutes.123
114. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. See generally Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Forms and
Limits of Religious Accommodation: The Case of RLUIPA, 32 CARDOZO L. REV 1907 (2011).
115. See S. 597 Hearings, Part 2, supra note 88, at 636–37 (statement of Rev. William F. Fore,
Executive Director, National Council of the Churches of Christ) (quoting Sch. Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963)).
116. See id. at 636–39.
117. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
118. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
119. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
120. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79.
121. Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987).
122. Id.
123. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (“[T]o say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemp-
tion is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required
. . . .”).  Nor does the Court’s recent holding in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
School v. EEOC affect this analysis. Hosanna-Tabor held that the government could not consti-
tutionally interfere with matters of internal church governance, but noted that Smith still applied
to “outward physical acts.”  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132
S. Ct. 694, 702, 707 (2012).  Public performances of copyrighted works are outward physical acts.
66 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:49
Section 110(3)’s religious exemption to general copyright liability
predates the Smith decision, but so did many other federal legislative
provisions that exempted religions from otherwise generally applica-
ble laws.124  In the aftermath of the Smith decision, Congress passed
the sweeping Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)125 and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).126
These Acts were designed to restore the Sherbert and Yoder strict
scrutiny analysis for governmental burdens on religious exercise.127  In
addition, during the past two decades, Congress has inserted more
than 200 targeted religious exemptions into numerous categories of
legislation.128  As a result of these heightened protections and special
exemptions, “religious organizations of all faiths stand in a position
that American businesses—and the thousands of nonprofit groups
without that ‘religious’ label—can only envy.”129  The perennial ques-
tion across these contexts becomes: At what point does exemption out
of respect for free exercise become religious favoritism, trespassing on
the domain of the Establishment Clause?  While the Court has fa-
mously remarked that “there is room for play in the joints” between
the two Religion Clauses, and thus allowed legislatures to make relig-
ious accommodations,130 not all accommodations are constitutional.
124. For example, section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 exempted religious institutions
from its employment nondiscrimination requirements. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-352, § 702, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2012)).
125. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012)), invalidated in part by City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
126. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2012)).
127. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (prohibiting government from substantially burdening
free exercise of religion unless such “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest”), and
id. § 2000cc(a)(1) (imposing the same restrictions on governmental regulation of land use that
“substantial[ly] burden[s]” religious exercise), with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963)
(“[A]ny incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant’s religion may be justified by a com-
pelling state interest . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 214 (1972) (noting that there must be “a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override
the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause”).
128. Diana Henriques, Religion Trumps Regulation As Legal Exemptions Grow, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 8, 2006, at 1.
129. Id.
130. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005) (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718
(2004); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
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B. Section 110(3) and the Supreme Court’s Test for Religious
Accommodations in Cutter v. Wilkinson
The Supreme Court clarified the standards for evaluating religious
accommodations in Cutter v. Wilkinson.131 Cutter concerned the pro-
vision of various religious accommodations, including access to relig-
ious literature and opportunities to attend group worship, within Ohio
prisons.132  In examining the constitutionality of RLUIPA, the Court
held that Congress is permitted to accommodate private religious ex-
ercise if the accommodation satisfies three requirements.  First, the
accommodation must “alleviate exceptional government-created bur-
dens on religion.”133  Second, in accommodating such religious exer-
cise, Congress may not unduly burden the interests of third parties.134
Third, any accommodations must be applied “neutrally among differ-
ent faiths.”135  Only the first two of Cutter’s standards are invoked in
analyzing § 110(3), as the exemption does not facially discriminate be-
tween religious persuasions.
1. Section 110(3) Does Not Respond to an Exceptional
Government-Created Burden on Religion
As a preliminary matter, religious exemptions that are incorporated
into broad exemptions for similarly situated organizations are consti-
tutional.  Statutes enlisting a “wide spectrum of organizations” to ad-
dress community issues, “neutral with respect to the grantee’s status
as a sectarian or purely secular institution,” are routinely upheld.136
Thus, in Walz v. Tax Commission, the Court held that it was not un-
constitutional to exempt churches from property taxes, where the ex-
emption similarly applied to other “association[s] organized . . . for
the moral or mental improvement of men and women.”137  Because
the statute in Walz “ha[d] not singled out one particular church or
131. Cf. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 727 n.1 (Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing delight that the ma-
jority abandoned the “discredited test of Lemon v. Kurtzman”).
132. Id. at 713 (majority opinion).
133. Id. at 720.
134. Id.; accord Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 709–710 (1985); Trans World
Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
135. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720.
136. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 608 (1988).  As the Court later put it, “The provision of
benefits to [a] broad spectrum of groups . . . is an important index of secular effect.”  Tex.
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 11 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981)). But see Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 328 (1987)
(“Where, as here, government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens
the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that the exemption come packaged with
benefits to secular entities.”). Cutter reiterated Amos’s language. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 724.
137. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 667 n.1 (1970).
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religious group, or even churches as such,” the exemption was
constitutional.138
Government actions that exclude religious organizations from these
laundry lists of beneficiaries are easy targets for other First Amend-
ment challenges.  In Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District, the Supreme Court addressed just such a conundrum,
where New York law permitted local school boards to adopt reasona-
ble regulations governing community organizations’ extracurricular
use of school facilities.139  New York courts had interpreted the law to
allow a wide spectrum of community meetings in public school facili-
ties, but to prohibit any religious meetings.140  The Supreme Court
forbade such religious viewpoint discrimination under the Free
Speech Clause.141  Excluding religious organizations also invites Free
Exercise Clause challenges.  As the Ninth Circuit explained in World-
wide Church of God, “we must be careful not to deprive religious or-
ganizations of all recourse to the protections of civil law that are
available to all others.  Such a deprivation would raise its own serious
problems under the Free Exercise Clause.”142
Under this analysis, the 1909 Act’s performance rights exemption
for “educational, religious, and charitable” institutions was not facially
problematic.  Neither is the modern § 110(4), which sets out specific
nonprofit criteria for exemption that place religious activities on equal
terms with schools and charities.  While broadly applicable statutes
can still be subjected to Establishment Clause challenges if, when ap-
plied, they primarily benefit religion,143 there is no evidence that
§ 110(4) has in any way benefitted religious performances more than
the other exempted categories.
138. Id. at 672–73.
139. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 386 (1993).
140. Id. at 387.
141. See id. at 394–95.
142. Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir.
2000) (quoting Maktab Tarighe Oveyssi Shah Maghssoudi, Inc. v. Kianfar, 179 F.3d 1244, 1248
(9th Cir. 1999)).  Laws which expressly exclude religions from protection are also contestable
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Susan Gellman &
Susan Looper-Friedman, Thou Shalt Use the Equal Protection Clause for Religion Cases (Not
Just the Establishment Clause), 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 665, 666 (2008).
143. Compare, e.g., Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (invalidating state-
funded educational programs in private schools, where 40 of the 41 beneficiaries were religious
schools), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), with Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding a private voucher program to help children escape failing public
schools as private choice, even though 46 of the 56 schools were religiously affiliated).  The
Supreme Court recently heard arguments in a similar case, Arizona Christian School Tuition
Organization v. Winn, but ultimately tossed it out on standing grounds. Ariz. Christian Sch.
Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1449 (2011).
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Analytical difficulties arise, however, where religion receives ex-
emptions or benefits not granted to other institutions.  Section 110(3)
of the 1976 Act grants an exclusive benefit to religion, allowing for-
profit performances of dramatic works by paid performers, so long as
the works are “of a religious nature” and performed “in the course of
services.”144  Such an exemption is only constitutional if it “alleviates
exceptional government-created burdens on private religious
exercise.”145
The Supreme Court has not always allowed exemptions that vary by
organization type.  In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, a plurality of the
Court found that “[t]he fact that Texas grants other sales tax exemp-
tions . . . for different purposes does not rescue the exemption for re-
ligious periodicals from invalidation.”146 Texas Monthly concerned a
magazine which lost its sales tax exemption when the exemption law
was repealed for all but religious magazines.147  The magazine sued,
asserting an Establishment Clause violation.148  The state defended
the repeal by noting that there were many sales tax exemptions for
many purposes; considered broadly, the religious exemption was not
unconstitutionally preferential.149  The Supreme Court disagreed.  A
plurality held that although there were other sales tax exemptions in
Texas, those exemptions did not apply to the sale of publications by
similarly situated nonprofit organizations.150  Because no similar ex-
emptions existed, the plurality concluded that exempting religious
magazines alone could not be “grounded in some secular legislative
policy.”151
The Supreme Court’s secular policy language in Texas Monthly
hearkened back to the required secular purpose-and-effect analysis
under the now-outmoded test set out in Lemon v. Kurtzman.152  In
144. 17 U.S.C. § 110(3) (2012).
145. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005).
146. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14 n.4 (1989) (plurality opinion).
147. Id. at 5–6.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 14 n.4.
150. Id. at 5.
151. Id. at 14 n.4.
152. Lemon set out three criteria to determine a statute’s constitutionality under the Estab-
lishment Clause: (1) it must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it must not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion.  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
There is a continuing debate about when and where the Lemon test actually applies. See, e.g.,
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he factors identified in
Lemon serve as no more than helpful signposts.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Lamb’s
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles
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Cutter, the Court declined to consider a Lemon-based purpose-and-
effect analysis in assessing the constitutionality of RLUIPA.153  This is
likely because, as Justice Thomas noted in his concurrence, strict ad-
herence to Lemon would render any accommodation of religion per
se unconstitutional.154
The need under Lemon to accommodate religion without evincing a
religious motive led to the somewhat paradoxical holding in Corpora-
tion of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos.  There, the Supreme Court held
that accommodating religion can satisfy the secular purpose of avert-
ing government interference in religious affairs.155  In Cutter, the
Court attempted to resolve this doctrinal tension by recognizing that
Lemon’s secular purpose-and-effect criteria were too limited.156  The
Court re-crafted the test to say, essentially, that Congress could act
with the intent to benefit religion if it had a good reason—namely,
alleviating an exceptional burden which another governmental action
had placed on private religious exercise.157
In Cutter, the Court did not expressly foreclose all purpose-and-ef-
fect analysis in the accommodation context.158  Rather, the Court only
noted that alleviations of government-imposed burdens are more
likely to be viewed as permissible accommodations than as unconstitu-
tional establishments.159  Because the Supreme Court signaled in Cut-
ter, and in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal
the following term, that accommodations would continue to be evalu-
ated on an as-applied, case-by-case basis, the purpose-and-effect anal-
ysis could still be of importance in future Religion Clause
jurisprudence.160
In United Christian Scientists v. Christian Science Board of Direc-
tors,161 the Supreme Court provided an instructive example regarding
unconstitutional purpose and effect.  In that case, Congress granted
one Christian Science branch a private, perpetual copyright to
founder Mary Baker Eddy’s writings.162  Citing an extensive catalog of
abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause juris-
prudence once again, frightening the little children . . . .”).
153. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 717 & n.6 (2005).
154. Id. at 726 n.1 (Thomas, J., concurring).
155. Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).
156. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 717 n.6.
157. See id. at 720.
158. See id. at 726.
159. See id.
160. Id. at 722, 726; Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418, 436 (2006).
161. United Christian Scientists v. Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs., 829 F.2d 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
162. Id. at 1157.
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the legislative history, the D.C. Circuit found that Congress’s purpose
in granting this copyright was to preempt a dispute over doctrinal pu-
rity with another Christian Science organization.163  Because Congress
acted with the express purpose of favoring one religious branch over
another, the Court held that the private law violated the Establish-
ment Clause.164
It is debatable whether § 110(3) of the 1976 Act had a purpose to
advance religion.  On one hand, section 104 of the 1909 Act, as well as
§ 110(4) in the 1976 Act, simply sought to provide equal benefits
across various educational, charitable, religious, and nonprofit socie-
ties.  With that background, § 110(3)’s specific religious tailoring could
be viewed as supplying a greater benefit to religions than to other
comparable organizations.
On the other hand, § 110 read as a whole provides a broad list of
exemptions, spelling out in greater detail what does or does not con-
stitute infringing performances.165  For example, §§ 110(1) and 110(2)
provide greater clarity on permissible use in an educational context,166
and § 110(10) extends the protection afforded to some classes of non-
profits.167  Under that framing, § 110(3) takes into account the specific
needs of churches in their performances, and specifically tailors the
exemption to those needs.
This legislative attunement evinces a purpose to benefit religion in a
singular way.  However, such legislative attunements based on de-
tailed fact-finding are not per se impermissible because one subject
class is religious.168  If the conferred benefit directly responds to an
exceptional government-imposed burden on religious exercise, then it
is a constitutional accommodation.169
The issue presented is therefore whether § 110(3)’s religious exemp-
tion alleviates an exceptional burden.  Copyright law, broadly, is a
163. Id. at 1162–65.
164. Id. at 1171.
165. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(1)–(10) (2012).
166. See id. § 110(1)–(2).
167. Id. § 110(10).
168. See, e.g., Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987).
169. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005). But see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952) (upholding a public school’s “released time” program for religious instruction as accom-
modating students’ religious practice).  Professors Lupu and Tuttle have indicated that under the
Cutter accommodation factors, Zorach would have come out differently. See Ira C. Lupu &
Robert W. Tuttle, Instruments of Accommodation: The Military Chaplaincy and the Constitution,
110 W. VA. L. REV. 89, 104 (2007).
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generally applicable, government-imposed burden.170  As the Copy-
right Office testified, the various § 110 exemptions were designed to
extend the essence of the protections in section 104 of the 1909 Act to
each of those nonprofit organizations which Congress found most de-
serving.171  As discussed above, churches are unique in the perform-
ance context, in part because music is critical to their worship, and
because they often maintain a professional musical staff.172  Thus, for
religions, Congress chose to specifically accommodate musical per-
formances in worship services.173
The critical question is whether § 110(3) alleviated an “exceptional”
government-imposed burden on religious exercise.  While the Cutter
court did not define exceptional burden, such a burden could be con-
ceived of in two ways.  First, exceptional could be thought of as a bur-
den that is qualitatively “distinctive,” or unique, to the religious
context.174  Alternatively, “exceptional” could be considered a quanti-
tative matter of degree.
Under the first framing, a church’s need to perform religious dra-
matico-musical works during its services could be considered analo-
gous to a church’s need to discriminate on the basis of religion in
religious employment.175  Musical performances during worship are
unique to the religious context.  Nonprofits, however, could readily
respond to the religious exemption by saying that the burden on
churches is not exceptional, or qualitatively different, than the burden
placed on similarly situated nonprofits.  Nonprofits could point to in-
stances where they were burdened by their requirement, a require-
ment not always imposed on religious institutions, to obtain a license
to perform dramatic works at their functions.176  To music-centered
170. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“Con-
gress . . . has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be
granted to authors . . . .”).
171. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUD-
IES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, STUDY
NO. 16: LIMITATIONS ON PERFORMING RIGHTS 84 (Comm. Print 1960) (authored by Borge
Varmer).
172. See WILSON-DICKSON, supra note 7.
173. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART
6: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 38 (Comm. Print 1965) (noting that churches
had asked for a performance exemption to cover “sacred music which might be regarded as
‘dramatic’ in character”).
174. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 169, at 110 (discussing the Court’s findings and holding in
Amos).
175. Cf. Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336–37 (1987).
176. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(4) (2012).  For example, the voice and theatre departments of conser-
vatories must license dramatic works even for use in classroom workshops. No other exemption
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schools and nonprofits, the burden placed on them to comply with
copyright law’s performance-licensing demands is comparable to the
burden placed on religious worship.  In Texas Monthly, a legislature
confining a sales tax exemption “exclusively to publications advancing
the tenets of a religious faith” ran afoul of the Establishment
Clause.177  In the copyright context, confining a licensing exemption
exclusively to religious performances should fail by analogy.
Under the second framing, what is “exceptional” could be consid-
ered a matter of degree.  A quantitative analysis simply asks: does this
place a large burden on religion?  This analysis compares that burden
to those experienced by similarly situated nonprofits.  This construc-
tion of exceptional burdens could thus be viewed in light of the “sub-
stantial burden” standard mandated by RFRA and applied in the
analogous RLUIPA context in Cutter.178
RFRA gives courts the ability to carve out exemptions from other-
wise generally applicable law, so long as the law substantially burdens
religion and is not justified by a compelling governmental interest.179
If an “exceptional” burden under Cutter is equated with a “substan-
tial” burden under RFRA, or if courts consider exceptional to be an
even higher standard, then § 110(3) cannot survive constitutional scru-
tiny.  Copyright performance licensing is not a substantial burden on
religion.  Requiring licensing of musical performances is comparable
to a government-mandated tax or fee.  General taxes and fees which
require religious activities to pay the same amount as other organiza-
tions have routinely been held to not impose substantial burdens.180
Deleting § 110(3) entirely would not impose a significant state-cre-
ated deterrent to the free exercise of religion.181  Copyright law al-
ready requires churches to purchase unique copies of sheet music and
to license broadcast performances.182  Requiring performance licens-
in 17 U.S.C. § 110 covers any class of dramatic works.  This Author’s communications with the
Executive Director of the National Association of Teachers of Singing confirm that universities
license modern operas and musicals for educational purposes.
177. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) (plurality opinion).
178. Prior to Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883–84 (1990), this analysis would
have been conducted under the Free Exercise Clause.  In response to Smith, strict scrutiny analy-
sis is mandated by RFRA, and not the Constitution.  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
179. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
180. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699–700 (1989) (declining to order the IRS to treat
purchases of Scientology audits as a tax-deductible religious contribution); United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252 (1982) (declining to exempt Amish employees from social security taxes).
181. See Tex. Monthly, 489 U.S. at 15 (plurality opinion).
182. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights
to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords . . . .”); see also id. § 101 (defining “[t]o perform or display a work ‘publicly’” as
including transmissions of the work); Simpleville Music v. Mizell, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1298
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ing, even as it leaves the church fewer resources available for other
religious activities, is a constitutionally insignificant fee.183  A licensing
fee does not affect the content of the music, the beliefs the music con-
veys, or the ability of churches to perform the work.  Even if general
licensing fees do constitute a substantial burden, the Supreme Court
has ruled that Congress has a compelling interest in maintaining a
straightforward copyright system “free of myriad exceptions.”184
Under either Cutter or RFRA, there is neither an “exceptional” nor a
“substantial” reason to alleviate copyright law’s performance licensing
burden on religion.
Alternatively, “exceptional” burdens could be considered to be a
lower standard than “substantial.”  Substantial burdens, after all, are
the language of strict scrutiny; to equate exceptional and substantial
would be to nullify the “play in the joints” language which Cutter itself
recognized.185  In this alternative analysis, exceptional burdens are
those which merely present enough of a deterrent to private religious
exercise as to be deserving of an exemption.186  This construction al-
lows churches to enhance their worship services by performing relig-
iously centered dramatic works without the administrative and
monetary burden necessitated by licensing requirements.  Without
§ 110(3), some churches may cease performances of dramatic works
altogether in order to avoid copyright infringement, even though sa-
cred works have a traditional place in their liturgy.  Under a standard
weaker than strict scrutiny, § 110(3) would qualify as exceptional
under Cutter.
Regardless of how courts define “exceptional,” § 110(3) is over-
broad.  While the differences in the paid-performers requirements be-
tween §§ 110(3) and 110(4) may be justified by the specific needs of
churches, the difference in profit requirements cannot be.  Unlike
§ 110(4), § 110(3) does not impose no-admission-fee limitations.187
(M.D. Ala. 2006); STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT REVISION,
PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVI-
SION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 38 (Comm. Print 1950).
183. Cf. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 391 (1990) (holding
that religious organizations can be required to pay sales tax on the sale of religious materials).
184. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699–700 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Lee, 455 U.S.
at 260).
185. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005); accord Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S.
664, 669 (1970).
186. See generally Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).  In Zorach, the Court held that a
public school accommodation for religious instruction was constitutional, id. at 314, even though
the burden on parents and students to seek religious instruction outside of school hours would
likely have been minimal.
187. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(3) (2012).
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Preventing churches from performing Jesus Christ Superstar, Joseph
and the Amazing Technicolor Dreamcoat, or Godspell for commercial
gain was precisely what Congress intended to prevent.188  Yet the ex-
press terms of the statute fail to foreclose such performances.  Despite
the Robert Stigwood result reached under section 104 of the 1909
Act,189 the priest defendants whose for-profit performance of Jesus
Christ Superstar was deemed infringing could plausibly have won
under § 110(3).  Justice Brennan commented in Amos that religious
accommodations used to benefit for-profit entities would likely be un-
constitutional.190  Because § 110(3) allows religious institutions to con-
vert their services from a nonprofit gathering of believers into a
lucrative gathering of customers, it is an unconstitutional
accommodation.
Under either interpretation of “exceptional,” § 110(3) does not alle-
viate an exceptional burden on religion.  Section 110(3) confers a ben-
efit on religion that is neither qualitatively different than the burdens
experienced by nonprofit institutions, nor is quantitatively exceptional
in terms of the weight of the burden placed on religion.  Furthermore,
§ 110(3) is overbroad because it exempts for-profit performances of
dramatico-musical works for religious purposes only.  This accommo-
dation is an “unlawful fostering of religion”191 and violates the Estab-
lishment Clause.
2. Section 110(3) Significantly Burdens Third-Party
Nonbeneficiaries
Section 110(3) does not satisfy Cutter’s second standard because it
unduly burdens the interests of third parties.192 Cutter’s third-party-
burden standard was adopted from Estate of Thornton v. Caldor.  In
Caldor, the Supreme Court struck down a Connecticut statute that
prohibited employers from disciplining or firing employees who re-
fused to work on their respective Sabbath days.193  The Court held
that the statute “impermissibly advance[d] a particular religious prac-
188. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT REVISION, PART 6:
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 38 (Comm. Print 1950).
189. See generally Robert Stigwood Grp., Ltd. v. O’Reilly, 346 F. Supp. 376 (D. Conn. 1972),
rev’d on other grounds, 530 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1976).
190. See generally Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 340–46 (1987) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
191. Id. at 334–35 (majority opinion) (quoting Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S.
136, 145 (1987)).
192. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005); see also Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,
472 U.S. 703, 709–10 (1985); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
193. Caldor, 472 U.S. at 710–11.
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tice” by “impos[ing] on employers and employees an absolute duty to
conform their business practices to the particular religious practices of
the employee.”194
Cutter formalized Caldor’s analysis as part two of its three-part ac-
commodation standard.  In Cutter, the Court held that religious ac-
commodations can impose some burdens on third parties, as long as
they are not “unreasonable.”195  The Supreme Court has ruled else-
where that private parties have only a de minimis duty to accommo-
date others’ religious practices.196  Religious accommodations cannot
be used to categorically shift costs from religious individuals onto sec-
ular third parties.197  Thus, the question is where the § 110(3) religious
accommodation imposes unreasonable burdens on third parties.
Section 110(3) imposes an unreasonable burden on third parties.
The significant burden under § 110(3) is not borne by churches, but
rather by uncompensated authors and composers.  As a result of
§ 110(3)’s religious exemption, composers of both nondramatic works
and dramatico-musical works of a religious nature lose licensing royal-
ties every week.  These private third parties bear the brunt of the
§ 110(3) exemption.
Just compensation for composers and publishers of religious music
was a critical issue in the Senate hearings on the 1976 Act.198  As Ed
Lorenz, the head of a religious music publishing house, pleaded with
Congress:
Gentlemen, you must leave no loopholes in this new copyright law
by which small portions of people can claim the right to use the
fruits of the labors and talents of the authors and composers of sa-
cred music without paying them for their work. . . .  Although the
portion of people claiming this right is small, it is the only group
who will use our copyrights.  This income, small as it is, is necessary
to our operations and the composers’ and authors’ livelihood.199
Lorenz’s testimony illustrates how the § 110(3) accommodation is a
double-edged sword.  While alleviating the burden for religious users
of copyrights to pay licensing fees, it simultaneously exacerbates the
194. Id. at 709–10.
195. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 726.
196. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84.
197. See Caldor, 472 U.S. 709.
198. See, e.g., H.R. 4347, 5680, 6831, 6835 Hearings, supra note 76, at 284 (statement of Ed
Lorenz, Managing General Partner, Lorenz Publishing Co.).  The Lorenz Corp. still specializes
in publishing music for churches. LORENZ CORP., http://www.lorenz.com/Divisions/LPC.
199. H.R. 4347, 5680, 6831, 6835 Hearings, supra note 76, at 284 (statement of Ed Lorenz,
Managing General Partner, Lorenz Publishing Co.).
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burden on the creators of religious copyrighted works, many of whom
are religious themselves, to work without compensation.200
While legislatures are allowed to accommodate private religious ex-
ercise, under Cutter those accommodations must not place undue bur-
dens on third parties.201  Just as the Supreme Court found that a law
which required accommodation of religious employees over all others
would discriminate against the nonreligious,202 so here, § 110(3)’s re-
quired accommodation of religious performances “discriminate[s]
against the publishers, authors, and composers of sacred music.”203  To
illustrate: if a church performs part of a secular dramatico-musical
work to illustrate a religious point, it must obtain a copyright license
from the author or else face infringement liability.  If the same church
performs a religious work, however, the § 110(3) exemption means it
can do so without obtaining a license.  Thus, for qualitatively identical
performances, secular authors receive compensation but religious au-
thors do not.  Presumably, authors of religious works wrote the works
for religious use—but § 110(3) bars those authors from collecting li-
censing revenue from exploitations of their public performance rights.
Section 110(3) benefits churches by saving them licensing fees, but
burdens authors by precluding payment.  Because this regime places
unreasonable burdens on third-party nonbeneficiaries, § 110(3) is
unconstitutional.204
C. Section 110(3) Unconstitutionally Requires Courts to Assess the
Religious Character of Works and Services
A separate Establishment Clause issue raised by § 110(3) is whether
the judiciary is competent to evaluate the religious substance of the
statute.  The perennial problem with religious exemptions is that they
force courts to define religion.  Traditionally, the Supreme Court has
defined religion by reference to individual and institutional “sincerely
held beliefs.”205  While the Court has recognized that “distinguishing
between religious and secular convictions” and “determining whether
200. See id. at 283 (noting that “[t]hese Christian composers and authors are fine people”
pursuing “inspiration” in writing sacred music).
201. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 80 (declining to require an airline to “circumvent[ ] the [neu-
tral] seniority system” and deprive other employees of their “contractual rights under the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement” in order to absolutely prefer one person’s Sabbath observance as
mandated by the challenged statute).
202. Id. at 85.
203. H.R. 4347, 5680, 6831, 6835 Hearings, supra note 76, at 285 (statement of Ed Lorenz,
Managing General Partner, Lorenz Publishing Co.).
204. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005).
205. See, e.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989).
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a professed belief is sincerely held” are difficult tasks,206 lower courts
can look to evidence from the individual’s life and the institution’s
history in order to make the assessment.  Often, litigants concede re-
ligious sincerity upfront.207
One problem with § 110(3) is that it lacks an external reference
point, such as individual or institutional belief, from which to define
“dramatico-musical work of a religious nature.”  Similarly, although
free speech caselaw in the public forum context attempts to define
what constitutes religious worship services as opposed to religious
meetings, the distinctions have been highly problematic, prompting a
circuit split on indistinguishable facts.208
The Lemon court referred to this dilemma as one of “excessive en-
tanglement.”209  The touchstone of excessive entanglement analysis is
the extent to which a statute will necessitate governmental interfer-
ence with and analysis of religious activities.210  Detailed state scrutiny
into “substantive ecclesiastical matters” can “only produce by its coer-
cive effect the very opposite of that separation of church and state
contemplated by the First Amendment.”211
In the accommodation context, the Amos Court found that religious
exemptions are constitutional where their purpose is to “effectuate a
more complete separation of [church and state]” and therefore side-
step “intrusive inquiry into religious belief.”212  If Congress deter-
mined that accommodation of religious practice is the best solution to
a legislative difficulty, courts should give deference to that congres-
sional judgment.213  Pragmatic recognition of unique religious inter-
206. Id. at 833.
207. E.g., id. (“We do not face problems about sincerity or about the religious nature of Fra-
zee’s convictions . . . .  [T]he State concedes it.”).
208. Compare Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 778–81 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting
religious worship versus religious speech distinction), and Church on the Rock v. City of Albu-
querque, 84 F.3d 1273, 1278–79 (10th Cir. 1996) (rejecting religious worship versus religious
speech distinction), with Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 650 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2011),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 816 (2011).
209. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
210. The prohibition on excessive government entanglement with religion “rests upon the pre-
mise that both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left
free from the other within its respective sphere.”  Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333
U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
211. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972).
212. Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987).
213. See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 716 (2010) (plurality opinion).
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ests is permissible;214 not all “statutes that give special consideration
to religious groups are per se invalid.”215
In Texas Monthly, the Court pushed back against this analysis and
followed the Amos decision’s underlying logic that the goal is to avoid
state and religious interaction to the greatest extent possible.216
There, the Court found that the sales tax exemption “on its face, [ap-
peared] to produce greater state entanglement with religion than the
denial of an exemption,” because the state would become the ultimate
arbitrator of the religious themes of publications.217
As these cases illustrate, Supreme Court precedent forbids govern-
ment creation and application of multifaceted tests for determining
the religious character of an activity or institution.218  Judicial inquiry
into religious views and worship practices is “not only unnecessary but
also offensive.”219  It is not appropriate for a governmental institution
to parse what content is or is not religious.220
Most recently, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
School v. EEOC, the Supreme Court reiterated that religious excep-
tions should ensure that the authority to control ecclesiastical matters
belong to the church alone.221  The 1976 Act’s religious exemption vi-
olates this principle by demanding adjudication of whether or not
church meetings and performances are “religious.”  Due to the multi-
ple “religious” qualifiers presented in § 110(3), this accommodation
invites, rather than avoids, judicial scrutiny into religious substance.
First, dramatico-musical works “of a religious nature” are not de-
fined.  Many purportedly “secular” works have strong religious under-
214. Id. at 719 (“The Constitution does not oblige government to avoid any public acknowl-
edgment of religion’s role in society.”).
215. Amos, 483 U.S. at 338.
216. See Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 20 (plurality opinion).
217. Id.
218. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979) (“It is not only the [relig-
ious] conclusions that may be reached by the Board which may impinge on rights guaranteed by
the Religion Clauses, but also the very process of inquiry leading to findings and conclusions.”).
219. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (plurality opinion) (“[C]ourts should refrain
from trolling through a person’s or institution’s religious beliefs.”).
220. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 844 (1995).  Lower
courts have found state actions to be unauthorized under the First Amendment where the state
undertook to determine what foods are “kosher,” Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v.
Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 427 (2d Cir. 2002), whether church music is secular or religious, see Tomic v.
Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1041 (7th Cir. 2006), and which symbols in a church
are religious, Does v. Enfield Pub. Sch., 716 F. Supp. 2d 172, 197 (D. Conn. 2010) (finding it
problematic that “[w]hat constitutes a ‘religious image or message’ will be determined by the
Enfield School Board or its agent”).
221. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709
(2012).
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pinnings because of religion’s importance in society as a whole.  For
example, the composer Julian Anderson recently set the Latin Mass to
music in his Heaven is Shy of Earth, yet expressly stated “this is not a
sacred work.”222  If an American Catholic diocese performed this
work during Mass, and Anderson sued, § 110(3) would require a de-
tailed court analysis of whether Anderson’s work was sufficiently re-
ligious to insulate a church from liability.  Such determinations run
afoul of the Supreme Court’s longstanding aversion to government
interpretation of religious qualities.223
Although this Article has used churches as a convenient shorthand
for those who would most likely invoke the § 110(3) exemption, it is
important to remember that the statute imposes no institutional re-
quirement on these performances.  It only requires that the work be
“of a religious nature” and performed “in the course of services.”224
There is no statutory requirement that the work and the worship ser-
vice be from the same religious tradition.  Thus, nothing prevents one
religion from using the sacred works of another.  Atheists, whom
some courts have recognized as belonging to a religion,225 could per-
form Godspell in a meeting mocking others’ belief in God, and still
qualify for the exemption.  Copyright holders would, presumably,
loath that result.  Yet, if  the statute is interpreted to require the relig-
ious works to doctrinally align with the religious services, then it
would force courts “to inquire into the significance of words and prac-
tices to different religious faiths, and in varying circumstances by the
same faith,” which is forbidden.226
Second, the “in the course of [religious] services” clause is similarly
vague.  The word “service” connotes state recognition of the principal
hour-long Friday, Saturday, or Sunday meetings at a mosque, syna-
gogue, or cathedral.  Services are not limited to those contexts, how-
ever.227  Religious “services” could also encompass events held at any
time, potentially including Christian revivals, Sufi Islam dhikrs, and
222. Heaven is Shy of Earth (2006), supra note 6 (“Despite the predominance of Latin relig-
ious texts, this is not a sacred work.  It is not a Mass setting, but uses its range of texts (including
part of the mass) to celebrate the beauties of the natural world.  In this sense it is in the tradition
of such ‘secular’ masses as Janacek’s Glagolitic Mass or Martinu’s Field Mass.”).
223. See, e.g., Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (recognizing “a spirit
of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation, in
short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church govern-
ment as well as those of faith and doctrine”).
224. 17 U.S.C. § 110(3) (2012).
225. See Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 682 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding atheism to be a
religion for purposes of the Religion Clauses).
226. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 n.6 (1981).
227. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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Zoroastrian festivals.  While the legislative history specified that chari-
table dinners and other events hosted by churches would not be cov-
ered by § 110(3)228—although they might by § 110(4)—in practice, it
will be difficult for courts to separate extracurricular religious events
from core religious services.229  But courts are precluded from making
this distinction.230
As an illustrative example, a Billy Graham Crusade, charging ad-
mission to fill an 80,000 seat stadium, employing a professional choir
and orchestra, and performing excerpts of Jesus Christ Superstar,
would not be required to obtain licenses for its performances if it
could prove the Crusade was a religious “service.”  If a court were to
distinguish such an event from a “service” on the basis that, for exam-
ple, communion was not served, it would effectively engage in the fine
parsing of religious questions which the Establishment Clause forbids.
Because, under the Establishment Clause, it is neither appropriate for
government to evaluate the religious versus secular components of
dramatic works, nor desirable for government to differentiate be-
tween religious worship as opposed to religious meetings, § 110(3) is
unconstitutional.  Before this constitutional question is adjudicated in
federal litigation, however, Congress should amend § 110 to remove
its First Amendment defects.
D. Congress Should Repeal Section 110(3) and Amend Section
110(4) to Allow a More Limited Religious Accommodation
When faced with a statute that calls for courts to judge religious
versus secular content, as in Texas Monthly, legislatures can correct
228. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 84–85 (1976).
229. In the public fora context, these distinctions between religious meetings and worship
services have produced nightmarish results. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. Bronx
Household of Faith distinguished meetings from services this way:
While the conduct of religious services undoubtedly includes expressions of a religious
point of view, it is not the expression of that point of view that is prohibited by the rule.
Prayer, religious instruction, expression of devotion to God, and the singing of hymns,
whether done by a person or a group, do not constitute the conduct of worship ser-
vices. . . .  What is prohibited by this clause is solely the conduct of a particular type of
event: a collective activity characteristically done according to an order prescribed by
and under the auspices of an organized religion, typically but not necessarily conducted
by an ordained official of the religion.
Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 650 F.3d 30, 36–37 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 1325 S.
Ct. 816 (2011).  For detailed analysis of the unconstitutionality of that definition, see Brief of the
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners for Certiorari at
19–22, Bronx Household of Faith, 650 F.3d 30 (No. 11-386).
230. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 111–12 (2001); see also Widmar,
454 U.S. at 269 n.6 (concluding that a distinction between religious worship and religious speech
lies outside “the judicial competence to administer” and is hopelessly entangling).
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the Establishment Clause violation in two ways: they may either elimi-
nate the religious exemption, or they may extend the exemption to all
who are similarly situated.  Either solution has the constitutionally de-
sirable effect of precluding the state from evaluating the religious
merits.231
Here, Congress could avoid the quandary of judges evaluating the
religious questions § 110(3) presents by eliminating the “in the course
of services” and “of a religious nature” language altogether.  Such an
amended clause would exempt “performance of a nondramatic liter-
ary, musical, or dramatico-musical work at a place of worship or other
religious assembly.”  This leaves the “at a religious assembly” clause
intact, which could present its own difficulties.  This qualifier is less
severe, however, because whether or not a building is a place of wor-
ship is a common statutory definition, at least at the municipal zoning
level,232 and thus does not lead to the same level of state-interpreta-
tion concern.
While this solution would help remedy the excessive entanglement
defect, it would also bestow an even larger exclusive benefit upon reli-
gions, heightening concerns under Cutter’s accommodation test.  To
eliminate this concern, either a broader exemption should also be ex-
tended to other nonprofits, or § 110(3) should be eliminated alto-
gether.233  If Congress chose to expand a dramatic works performance
exemption to all nonprofits, hearkening back to the 1909 Act, it would
clearly be constitutional.234
Realistically, however, copyright holders would vociferously oppose
any such amendment.  Such sweeping language would completely
override the current limitations required by § 110(4), and would effec-
tively eliminate a sizeable portion of copyright holders’ exclusive pub-
lic performance rights.  From this pragmatic perspective, it would be
better for Congress to repeal the religious exemption altogether.235
Congress could still choose, however, to alleviate copyright law’s
exceptional burdens on religion in a more narrowly tailored way.
While repealing § 110(3), Congress could add an extra subsection
under § 110(4) to specifically address the concern over paid perform-
ers and any other unique burdens born by religion.  For example,
231. See Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15–16, 18 (1989) (plurality opinion).
232. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf.
233. See Tex. Monthly, 489 U.S. at 15–16, 18 (plurality opinion).
234. Cf. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
235. Cf. Tex. Monthly, 489 U.S. at 18 (plurality opinion) (“[N]othing in our decisions under
the Free Exercise Clause prevents the State from eliminating altogether its exemption for relig-
ious publications.”).
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Congress could determine that the musicians need not be volunteers
for nonprofit performances located at places of worship.  Under the
Supreme Court’s accommodation jurisprudence, this narrower exemp-
tion would be permissible.  This Author recommends an amended 17
U.S.C. § 110(4), which would add subsections (A)(i) and (C) as
follows:
17 U.S.C. § 110
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 106, the following are not
infringements of copyright
. . . .
(4) performance of a nondramatic literary or musical work other-
wise than in a transmission to the public, without any purpose of
direct or indirect commercial advantage and without payment of
any fee or other compensation for the performance to any of its
performers, promoters, or organizers, if –
(A) there is no direct or indirect admission charge;
(i) for performances at a place of worship, voluntary contribu-
tions by attendees, for the purposes of this subsection, do not
constitute an admission charge and do not have a purpose of
direct or indirect commercial advantage; or
(B) the proceeds, after deducting the reasonable costs of produc-
ing the performance, are used exclusively for educational, relig-
ious, or charitable purposes and not for private financial gain,
except where the copyright owner has served notice of objection
to the performance under the following conditions:
(i) the notice shall be in writing and signed by the copyright
owner or such owner’s duly authorized agent; and
(ii) the notice shall be served on the person responsible for the
performance at least seven days before the date of the perform-
ance, and shall state the reasons for the objection; and
(iii) the notice shall comply, in form, content, and manner of
service, with requirements that the Register of Copyrights shall
prescribe by regulation;
(C) for a performance at a place of worship, it is not an infringe-
ment of copyright if the performers, promoters, or organizers are
paid a fee or other compensation.
This solution addresses the most important unique considerations of
churches, while eliminating the for-profit “dramatico-musical work of
a religious nature” exemption which currently raises the greatest Es-
tablishment Clause concerns.  Under the proposed amendments to
§ 110(4), performances of dramatic works, such as Jesus Christ Super-
star, would no longer be exempt; churches would always need to ob-
tain licenses for those performances.  This benefits composers, so that
their religious works would not be performed without them receiving
any compensation.  For nondramatic works, churches would remain
on largely equal terms with educational, charitable, and other non-
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profit institutions. All nonprofit institutions could perform a nondra-
matic copyrighted work without a license, so long as they do not
charge admission.
The first clarifying subsection states that voluntary contributions by
attendees surrounding a performance at a place of worship cannot be
construed as having a direct or indirect profit motive. This provision is
intended to legally separate those institutions who charge admission
as a requirement to attend an event, and those religious institutions
who allow open attendance, but collect voluntary tithes or other offer-
ings during the event.  While tithes and offerings would likely qualify
for an exemption under §110(4)(B), the clarifying addition in pro-
posed § 110(4)(A)(i) means that for such donations, the author of the
work cannot veto the performance.  This is a minor amendment which
does little to change the effect of § 110(4) overall, but it does grant
clarity to the definition of an “admission charge,” and thus lessens the
risk of litigation incurred by churches.
The second clarifying subsection is narrowly targeted to address the
most qualitatively unique burden born by churches during their per-
formances, which is not born by nonprofits generally.  As discussed
earlier, music, text, and other nondramatic works are central to much
religious practice.  Churches frequently hire organists, other instru-
mentalists, vocalists, and conductors to perform music during their
events.  Under a strict reading of § 110(4), these paid performers
would disqualify churches from the infringement exemption.  The new
subsection 110(4)(C) would alleviate this burden born by churches by
allowing them to pay their musicians.
These amendments would combine to give much narrower protec-
tion to religious institutions.  They could no longer perform dramatic
works, and they could no longer operate for profit and still receive an
exemption from infringement liability. These amendments would si-
multaneously eliminate the qualifiers on the type of religious event
and type of religious music, which are the root of the entanglement
concerns.  As a narrow accommodation of religious practice, the
amended section would be constitutional.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Cutter, the Supreme Court announced that religious accommoda-
tions are permissible where they alleviate exceptional government-im-
posed burdens on private religious exercise, and where they do not
impose unreasonable burdens on third parties.236  Section 110(3) is
236. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005).
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unconstitutional because it fails both of Cutter’s standards.  First, be-
cause it grants an overbroad exemption to religion, which is not justi-
fied by the difference in burdens experienced by religious and secular
organizations, it is unconstitutional.  Second, because it imposes an
unreasonable burden on third-party composers and copyright holders
to subsidize religious worship, it is unconstitutional.
Furthermore, the purpose of religious accommodations, under both
Amos and Texas Monthly, is to avoid state scrutiny of religiosity.  The
language utilized in § 110(3), however, invites detailed judicial analy-
sis of religious activities and religious works.  Should copyright hold-
ers actively seek to enforce their performance rights at religious
services, “continuing surveillance leading to an impermissible degree
of entanglement” would be the inevitable result.237  Courts would be
forced to both evaluate the strength of religious themes in various dra-
matico-musical works and adjudicate various day-to-day events and
performances across a panoply of religious denominations.  This is un-
constitutional under the Establishment Clause.
If a direct challenge to § 110(3) ever comes before the federal
courts, it will most likely be struck down as an unconstitutional tres-
pass upon the Establishment Clause.  Congress should proactively
cure this constitutional defect by repealing 17 U.S.C. § 110(3) and
granting a more limited religious accommodation under 17 U.S.C.
§ 110(4) before such a controversy ripens.
237. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 675.
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